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Lapeer Foundry: The NLRB Closes the Door on
Unilateral Economic Layoffs
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Labor-Management Legislation
With the passage of the Wagner Act' in 1935, the worker was given the
right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in strikes, picketing, and
other concerted activities.' These three rights were aimed at establishing a bal-
ance of bargaining power between the employer and the employee.3 Two subse-
quent amendments have been made to the Wagner Act in response to the abuse
of union power." In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act5 was passed to protect the em-
ployee's right to refrain from joining a union and to restrict the union's strike
and boycott weapons.6 The union's strike and boycott weapons were further re-
stricted by the Landrum-Griffin Act7 in 1959.' The Wagner Act and its two
subsequent amendments provide the legislative framework for any discussion of
the desired balance between labor and management and will be referred to col-
lectively as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
B. Legislation Pertaining to Employer Unilateral Action
The key part of the NLRA in relation to unilateral action by the employer
is section 8(a)(5), which sets forth mandatory subjects of bargaining and re-
quires the employer to bargain in good faith with the employee with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.9 Among the
mandatory subjects of bargaining in the category of other terms and conditions
of employment are layoffs.' 0 In the early years of the NLRA when the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) was attempting to define section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA, unilateral action by the employer was not considered to be a per se
violation of the NLRA." For the past several decades, however, the Board gen-
erally has applied a per se test of invalidity to unilateral employer action.'
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
69 (1982)).
2. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28 (1971).
3. Id.
4. See generally, J. GROSS. THE RESHAPING OF TnE NATIONAL LABOR RLATION S BOARD: NATIONAL LA-
BOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947 (1981); H. MILLIS & E. BRowN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TAFT-HART-
LEY (1950).
5. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
(1982)).
6. Modjeska, Federalism in Labor Relations-The Last Decade, 50 Omo ST. LJ. 487, 488 (1989).
7. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
8. Modjeska, supra note 6, at 488.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (Taft-Hartley Act).
10. C. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 336 (2d ed. & 3d Supp. 1982-86).
11. Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REv. 470, 471
(1966).
12. Id. at 473.
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Although called per se, the test could more accurately be termed a rebuttable
presumption, as a few limited defenses are available, including: bargaining to
impasse, unilateral action in response to unprotected union concerted activities
or pursuant to union consent, and occasionally business necessity.1
The fourth defense of justifiable business necessity will be the prime focus
of this Comment. This Comment will first discuss the major Supreme Court
decisions in the field of layoffs and similar unilateral terminations of employ-
ment based on economic necessity. The Comment will further discuss the
Board's current stance toward economically motivated layoffs that are imple-
mented by unilateral action. A discussion of the future implications of the
Board's current stance will follow. The discussion will consider prior case law
where the compelling economic circumstance defense was successfully used by
the employer to excuse unilateral action. Finally, the Comment will conclude by
suggesting that the compelling economic circumstance defense is a valid justifi-
cation for certain unilateral acts and that the Board should weigh the economic
situation of the employer before blindly labeling a unilateral economic layoff as
an illegal refusal to bargain.
II. FOUNDATION OF THE ECONOMIC LAYOFF AS A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
A. Katz and Fibreboard
The cornerstone case in the area of unilateral action by the employer is
NLRB v. Katz. 4 In Katz, the employer and the union had been in the process
of bargaining over merit increases, general wage increases, and sick leave bene-
fits. 15 Before the parties had completed the bargaining process or reached an
impasse, the employer unilaterally granted merit increases, changed the sick
leave policy, and instituted a new automatic wage increase system.' Although
the employer argued that the union had adopted obstructive negotiation tac-
tics17 and that the Board must find bad faith accompanying the unilateral ac-
tion to find a section 8(a)(5) violation, 8 the Supreme Court found that the
employer had violated the duty to bargain collectively with the union."9 How-
ever, the Court left open the possibility that other unilateral acts may be valid
by stating that "we do not foreclose the possibility that there might be circum-
stances which the Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying unilat-
eral action."20
13. Id. For a demonstration of the narrowness of the consent defense see NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp.,
381 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding that an employer had violated the NLRA by implementing a unilateral
layoff after rejecting the employer's defense of union consent, even though the union representative had stated that
the economic layoff was strictly a management prerogative).
14. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
15. Id. at 739-41.
16. Id. at 741.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 742.
19. Id. at 747.
20. id. at 748.
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The second important case in the area of unilateral action is Fibreboard
Corp. v. NLRB. 1 In Fibreboard, the union gave timely notice to the employer
that it wished to modify the existing contract betweeh the employer and the
union.2 2 In response, the employer notified the union that the employer would
be contracting out the maintenance work performed by union members and,
therefore, negotiation of a new contract would be meaningless." The Supreme
Court once again signaled the importance of collective bargaining and exhibited
its distaste for unilateral action by declaring that this replacement of union em-
ployees with an independent contractor was a mandatory subject of bargaining
and that the employer had violated the NLRA.2 ' In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Stewart was quick to point out that the majority opinion should not be read
to mandate that "every managerial decision which necessarily terminates an
individual's employment is subject to the duty to bargain."25 Stewart warned
that the broad language of the majority opinion should not be interpreted so as
to force the duty to bargain on the employer in relation to decisions which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control.2 Stewart noted the sharp departure from
the traditional free enterprise system that would occur if the unions were per-
mitted to bargain over decisions located at the core of entrepreneurial control.2 7
B. Foundation Cases in the 1980s
Katz and Fibreboard laid the framework for the per se test of unlawfulness
in regard to unilateral action by the employer. It was not until 1981 that the
Supreme Court again expressed its views on unilateral action. In First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,28 the Court took the first step in recognizing that
certain managerial decisions may be within Justice Stewart's protected core of
entrepreneurial control. In First National Maintenance, the employer was
under a contract to perform maintenance for a nursing home. Because of a
dispute with the nursing home, the contract was unilaterally terminated and the
employees who were working at the nursing home were subsequently dis-
charged.29 Before the nursing home contract was terminated, however, a union
was certified as the bargaining representative of the employees working at the
nursing home. Upon certification, the union requested but was denied a bar-
gaining session and a delay in the termination of the nursing home contract, as
21. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
22. Id. at 205. To meet the "timely notice" requirement, the union was required to give 60 days notice to the
employer of its desire to modify or terminate the agreement. Id.
23. Id. at 206.
24. Id. at 215.
25. Id. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart commented that:
Many decisions made by management affect the job security of employees. Decisions concerning the vol-
ume and kind of advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales, all may bear
upon the security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve "condi-
tions of employment" that they must be negotiated with the employees' bargaining representative.
Id.
27. Id. at 225-26 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
29. Id. at 668-70.
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the employer implemented the termination of the contract without bargaining.30
The Court held that the employer's unilateral action did not violate the NLRA
because the "harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in
deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons
outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's par-
ticipation in making the decision."'3'
The majority in First National Maintenance applied a two step test in ar-
riving at the conclusion that the employer's unilateral action was not violative of
the NLRA. First, collective bargaining is only required if the proposed subject
of discussion is amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining pro-
cess 2 and, second, if the benefit to the collective bargaining process of bargain-
ing outweighs the burden placed on conducting the business. 3 The first step
ensures that the employer can escape collective bargaining to the extent neces-
sary for the operation of a profitable business.34 The second step further ensures
that even when a subject is amenable to resolution through the bargaining pro-
cess, the employer is insulated from forced bargaining if the burden placed on
the employer outweighs the harm to the collective bargaining process. This deci-
sion essentially discards the per se test and provides the employer with the
means to justify unilateral action.
The Board, however, seemingly has not been able to apply the very clear
test in First National Maintenance. This difficulty is apparent in the Board's
Otis Elevator Co. I3 decision. In Otis II, the employer decided to terminate .
research and development operations in two separate plants and to consolidate
these two operations at a third existing plant.' 6 The employer took the action to
redesign the product in an effort to make it competitive in the market.37 Relying
on language in First National Maintenance and Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Fibreboard,'8 which recognized the importance of freeing manage-
ment from the constraints of collective bargaining to the extent necessary to run
a profitable business, the Board held that the employer's decision to transfer the
research and development operations was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.' 9
The plurality opinion focused upon the nature of the employer's decision.
Where the decision turns upon a change in the direction of the business, then it
is not amenable to resolution and can be implemented without prior bargaining
and without violating the NLRA.4 0 If, however, the decision turns merely on
30. Id. at 666-70.
31. Id. at 686.
32. Id. at 678.
33. Id. at 679.
34. Id. at 678-79.
35. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). This decision is referred to as Otis II because the Board had heard this case on
a prior occasion and found a NLRA violation. In Otis 11 the Board reversed its prior decision and held that the
employer had not violated the NLRA.
36. Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
37. Id. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 678-79.
38. Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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labor costs, it is amenable to resolution and any unilateral action would violate
the NLRA.4" Characterizing the decision as one affecting the direction of the
business, the Board found no violation of the NLRA. 42 Member Zimmerman
concurred in the finding that no NLRA violation had occurred. However, Zim-
merman dissented in part because he felt that the effects of the decision to
transfer the operations should have been a mandatory subject of bargaining.43
A concurring opinion in Otis II by Member Dennis clearly adopted the two
step analysis of First National Maintenance."" While the plurality and Zimmer-
man opinions concentrated on the first step of the First National Maintenance
test, Dennis developed both steps of the test. According to Dennis, the key fac-
tor in the first step is whether "a factor over which the union has control...
[is] a significant consideration in the employer's decision." 45 If the decision is
based on a factor over which the union has little or no control, the decision is
not amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining process and the
analysis ends.46 If the decision is based on a factor over which the union has
significant control, the analysis takes a second step and bargaining is required
only if the benefit to the collective bargaining process outweighs the resultant
burden on the employer.47 Dennis then set forth the relevant burden elements
outlined in First National Maintenance:
(a) extent of capital commitment . ..
(b) extent of changes in operation . ..
(c) need for speed . ..;
(d) need for flexibility . . .; [and]
(e) need for confidentiality.4 8
Dennis further highlighted courts of appeals decisions which had used these
types of criteria prior to and after First National Maintenance to allow unilat-
eral action by employers in efforts to avoid loss of a principal customer,'49 to
update plant technology,50 and to change an existing distribution system by re-
placing salesmen with independent contractors. 51 Dennis finally concluded that
the employer's decision in Otis If was not amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process, but he was quick to point out that even if a decision passed
the first step of the test, the decision would still have to pass the balancing test
of step two before it would be considered a mandatory subject of bargaining. 52
41. Id.
42. Id. at 893.
43. Id. at 900 (Zimmerman, concurring and dissenting).
44. Id. at 895 (Dennis, concurring). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
45. 369 N.L.R.B. at 897 (Dennis, concurring).
46. Id. (Dennis, concurring).
47. Id. (Dennis, concurring).
48. Id. (Dennis, concurring).
49. Id. at 898 (Dennis, concurring) (citing NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1972)).
50. Id. at 897 & n.9 (Dennis, concurring) (citing NLRB v. Island Typographers, 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1983)).
51. Id. at 898 (Dennis, concurring) (citing NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966)).
52. Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 899-900 (1984). Commenting on the application of step two of the First
National Maintenance test, Member Dennis stated that even if labor costs had been a significant factor in the
1990]
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After comparing the Otis II opinions to the Supreme Court's opinion in
First National Maintenance, it is clear that Member Dennis's concurring opin-
ion is the most accurate and instructive interpretation of the Court's two step
test. Although the plurality in Otis II properly ended the analysis of the issue
after finding that the employer's decision was not amenable to resolution
through the bargaining process, the absence of any comprehensive discussion of
the second step has led to confusion over the validity of the balancing test in
step two.
Before analyzing the Board's recent application of Otis H and First Na-
tional Maintenance, it is interesting to note the view of one court of appeals on
the confusion surrounding which test is proper when analyzing a unilateral ac-
tion case. In United Food and Commercial Workers v. NLRB,53 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that all three opinions
set forth in Otis II are still valid and that the Board has refused to choose one
standard as the definitive test.5 4 Instead, the Board has found that subsequent
cases either satisfy all or none of the tests developed in Otis II.5 The opinion in
United Food and Commercial Workers encourages the Board "to attempt to
articulate a majority-supported statement of the rule that the Board will be
applying now and in the future in determining whether a particular decision is
subject to mandatory bargaining,or not.""" Confusion concerning the applicable
rule becomes evident after examining the Board's treatment of decisions relat-
ing to economic layoffs.
III. LAPEER FOUNDRY: A RIGID APPROACH TO ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED
LAYOFFS
A. Pre-Lapeer Foundry Board Decisions
The Lapeer Foundry57 case is the focal point of the Board's recent efforts
to exclude any possibility of unilateral decision making by the employer when
an economic layoff is contemplated. To demonstrate the Board's progression to-
ward this stance, it is necessary to examine Board decisions prior to the Lapeer
Foundry decision. In Litton Business Systems,58 the employer had lawfully de-
cided to discontinue one type of printing process and institute a different and
employer's decision, this would not have required a decision that the employer's decision was a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Id. at 900.
53. 880 F.2d 1422 (1989).
54. Id. at 1432.
55. Id. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1130, 1134 (July 29, 1988)
(employer's decision did not violate the NLRA under any of the Otis II tests); Connecticut Color Inc., 288
N.L.R.B. No. 81, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1211, 1212 n.3 (Apr. 28, 1988) (employer's decision violated the NLRA
under any of the Otis If tests); Storer Cable TV, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1769, 1772 (June
15, 1989) (employer's decision violated the NLRA under any of the Otis II tests).
56. United Food and Commercial Workers, 880 F.2d at 1436-37.
57. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (July 20, 1988).
58. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 817 (1987), rev'd in part, NLRB v. Litton Financial Printing Div., 893 F.2d 1128
(9th Cir. 1990).
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more efficient printing process. 5 However, the Board found a section 8(a)(5)
violation because the employer failed to bargain over the decision to lay off ten
employees who worked primarily on the discarded printing process. 60 Although
the administrative law judge had found the conversion decision and the layoff
decision "inextricably intertwined" 68 1 and therefore not mandatory subjects of
bargaining, the majority in Litton determined that the layoff was an effect of
the conversion decision and therefore was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 62
A strong and well reasoned dissent by Chairman Dotson questioned the separa-
tion of the conversion decision and the layoff decision.63 Dotson reasoned that
the "layoff decision was totally dependent on and a natural result of [the] con-
version decision." ' Once the conversion decision was deemed proper without
prior bargaining, the employer should have been permitted to lay off employees
connected with the discarded printing process as the natural implementation of
the conversion decision. 3 Relying on First National Maintenance and its ex-
pression of the employer's need for unencumbered decision making to run a
profitable business, Dotson considered the conversion decision and the layoff de-
cision as one decision, which was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.6"
In NLRB v. Advertisers Manufacturing Co.,67 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was faced with a unilateral layoff decision that occurred after
certification of a bargaining representative but before the employer signed a
collective bargaining agreement.68 The employer's argument that the layoffs
were motivated by a downward trend in its sales and not by union animus was
rejected by the Board and the appellate court, which found the employer to be
in violation of the NLRA.69 Calling the economic circumstances of the em-
ployer irrelevant,7 0 the Seventh Circuit clearly indicated a return to the per se
test of invalidity in relation to unilateral action by an employer. No mention
was made of the First National Maintenance two step test. The Board and the
Seventh Circuit summarily assumed that the decision was amenable to resolu-
tion through the bargaining process and then failed to weigh the employer's
need to operate freely in order to run a profitable business.
59. Litton, 286 N.L.R.B. at 817. The decision to change printing processes was motivated by four factors:
dissatisfaction with the former process' product which caused a loss of orders; the greater economy of the new
process; the ability of the new process to handle surplus orders in the event of an emergency; and the expectation
that the new process would reduce training and equipment costs. Id.
60. Id. at 819.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 824 (Dotson, dissenting).
64. Id. (Dotson, dissenting).
65. Id. (Dotson, dissenting).
66. Id. at 825 (Dotson, dissenting). Dotson points out that certain management decisions may result in the
loss of jobs even though they are outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. Id.
67. 823 F.2d 1086 (1987).
68. Id. at 1090.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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B. Lapeer Foundry
The possibility of unilateral action by the employer in making economic
layoffs theoretically remained viable after Litton because Litton involved an ec-
onomic layoff linked with a unilateral decision to convert the employer's print-
ing process. Moreover, the Advertisers Manufacturing Co. decision was argua-
bly of little precedential value because it failed to apply the two step test of
First National Maintenance. This theoretical possibility of unilateral action in
the economic layoff area, however, was put to rest by the Lapeer Foundry deci-
sion. In Lapeer Foundry,"' seven employees were unilaterally laid off for eco-
nomic reasons without notice to the union.72 The Board found the employer's
action to be in violation of the NLRA and stated that economic layoffs were a
mandatory subject of bargaining.73 In arriving at this conclusion, the Board ap-
plied both the nature of the decision test in the Otis II plurality opinion and the
First National Maintenance two step test. 4 Under the nature of the decision
test, a decision to lay off employees turns on labor costs and must therefore be a
subject of bargaining.71 The two step test was satisfied because the union could
offer alternatives to the layoff and the burden of bargaining on the employer
was outweighed by the benefit accruing to the bargaining process. The Board
stated that "legal requirements that exist to ensure meaningful bargaining in a
timely fashion" are enough to adequately address any concerns of the em-
ployer.78 The Lapeer Foundry decision does pay lip service to the idea that com-
pelling economic circumstances may exist which would excuse an employer's
failure to bargain over a layoff decision,77 but the quick dismissal of Member
Dennis's two step test (equivalent to the First National Maintenance test)
makes the compelling economic circumstance defense meaningless or nonexis-
tent.7 8 The Board's satisfaction of the two step test is based on the legal require-
ments that exist which ensure bargaining in a meaningful and timely fashion."
It is difficult to hypothesize a situation where this ambiguous phrase could ever
be used to adequately weigh the burden of bargaining placed upon the employer
when economic circumstances require the employer to take unilateral action.
C. Post-Lapeer Foundry NLRB Decisions
Board decisions subsequent to Lapeer Foundry have strengthened the posi-
tion that no economic circumstances will justify a refusal to bargain before im-
plementing economically motivated layoffs. In Adair Standish Corp.,80 the em-
71. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (July 20, 1988).
72. Id. at 1003.
73. Id. at 1004.
74. Id. at 1003-04. The "nature of the decision" test as stated in Otis If is "whether [the decision] turns
upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs; not its effect on employees nor
a union's ability to offer alternatives." Otis Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1984) (emphasis in original).
75. Lapeer Foundry, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1004.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1005.
78. Id. at 1003-04.
79. Id. at 1004.
80. 292 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1345 (Feb. 8, 1989).
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ployer implemented economic layoffs without notification to the newly certified
union.81 The employer argued that it had no duty to bargain with the union
over this decision because the employer had always implemented economic lay-
offs without notice to the employees.82 The Board rejected this argument and
held that the employer violated the NLRA by unilaterally implementing the
layoffs because the intervention of the bargaining representative made this type
of action a mandatory subject of bargaining."3 Any possibility of a past practice
defense by employers was, therefore, soundly defeated by Adair Standish Corp.
The second major Board decision on economically motivated layoffs follow-
ing Lapeer Foundry was Stamping Specialty Co.' As in Adair Standish Corp.,
an employer faced with a decline in orders decided to implement a layoff.85
Relying on the Otis H nature of the business test,88 the Board held that the
employer had violated the NLRA.8 7 Stamping Specialty Co. does not mention
the First National Maintenance two step test. Furthermore, the uselessness of
the compelling economic circumstance defense is revealed as it is summarily
dismissed by the Board.88 In commenting on the defense, the Board offers only
the example of Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp."9 as representative of the compelling
economic circumstance defense.80 In Aquaslide, no NLRA violation was found
when an employer failed to bargain over a layoff decision brought on by a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.91 Restricting the defense to a bankruptcy situation evidences
the Board's intent to recognize this defense sparingly, if at all, in relation to
economic layoffs. Moreover, Aquaslide was decided prior to Lapeer Foundry
and no subsequent Board decisions have recognized this defense.92
In United Gilsonite,93 the Board again continued its rigid treatment of the
compelling economic circumstance defense. The decision to implement layoffs
was made because of a serious deterioration in business.9 ' The administrative
law judge "found that the layoff was directly and solely related to the economic
condition of the [employer]."" The Board nevertheless summarily dismissed the
employer's compelling economic circumstance argument.9 8 This decision once
again contains no discussion of the employer's specific economic situation. For
some reason, the Board feels compelled to pay lip service to the economic cir-
81. Adair Standish Corp., 130 LR.R.M (BNA) at 1345.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 294 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1740 (May 31, 1989).
85. Stamping Specialty Co., 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1741.
86. Id. See supra note 74.
87. Stamping Speciality Co., 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1742.
88. Id. at 1741.
89. 281 N.L.R.B. 219 (1986).
90. Stamping Specialty Co., 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1741.
91. 281 N.L.R.B. at 219 n.2.
92. Cf. FMC Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1130, 1133-34 (July 29, 1988) (employer's
unilateral act in shifting work from unionized plant to nonunionized plant did not violate the NLRA because the
Otis II tests were met and the employer's decision making ability regarding work relocation was not contractually
restricted).
93. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1034 (Nov. 30, 1988).
94. United Gilsonite, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1034.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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cumstance defense before dismissing it without a meaningful discussion in light
of the facts of each case,97 Furthermore, the opinion completely ignores any
reference to Otis H and First National Maintenance, the decisions which pro-
vide the basic principles on which the opinion should be based.
The post-Lapeer Foundry Board decisions have sent a clear message to em-
ployers that all economically motivated decisions to lay off employees must be
bargained over regardless of the employer's current economic situation. The
Board has demonstrated this by only paying lip service to the compelling eco-
nomic circumstance defense. In the three Board decisions following Lapeer
Foundry, the discussion of this defense has commanded only one sentence in the
respective opinions. In the future, it would not be surprising if the Board elimi-
nated any reference to this defense. That approach would more accurately dis-
play the Board's position toward the compelling economic circumstance defense.
IV. A SUGGESTED RETURN TO FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
A. The Lapeer Foundry line: Losing Sight of First National Maintenance
The Board, in arriving at its current stance toward the compelling eco-
nomic circumstance defense, has ignored the Supreme Court's First National
Maintenance decision. In First National Maintenance,98 a two step test was
adopted in reference to an employer's decision to close a part of its business
without prior bargaining. These steps are designed to protect the same goal as
the compelling economic circumstance defense. That goal was set forth in First
National Maintenance when Justice Blackmun stated that "[mlanagement
must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essen-
tial for the running of a profitable business." 99 If the employer is so constrained
by bargaining that it becomes impossible to operate profitably, all of the em-
ployees end up in the unemployment line. The Lapeer Foundry-line cases all
involve employers who implemented layoffs based solely on economic problems.
No union animus motivating the layoff decisions was found. When economic
conditions cause a need for layoffs, what can the union do to solve the economic
problems of the employer? By clinging so strongly to the position that every
economic layoff decision should be a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
Board loses sight of the fact that for the collective bargaining process to be
effective, the employer must be able to operate profitably so that the employer
is not forced into bankruptcy.
The Board's inability to accurately apply the Court's decision in First Na-
tional Maintenance did not originate in Lapeer Foundry. The confusion was
first encountered in Otis H where the Board arrived at three different formula-
97. Only once has the Board adequately considered the particular facts of a layoff decision and, not surpris-
ingly, no NLRA violation was found. Storer Cable TV, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1769 (June
15, 1989).
98. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
99. Id. at 678-79.
[Vol. 51:1049
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC LAYOFFS
tions of the test.100 As previously discussed, the concurring opinion written by
Member Dennis is the best restatement of the two step test; the plurality opin-
ion and Member Zimmerman's opinion failed to give any weight to step two of
the test.11 The plurality opinion's failure to consider step two has had preceden-
tial effect as the Lapeer Foundry-line cases have ignored the balancing test.
The Board should have adopted the test set forth in Member Dennis's con-
curring opinion. Only through the application of the two step test is the em-
ployer's ability to operate profitably adequately protected. When applying the
test, it is questionable whether the economically motivated decision to layoff
employees is amenable to resolution through the bargaining process. What ac-
tion can the bargaining representative take which will cure the economic woes
of the employer?10 2 Moreover, the second step of the test would certainly re-
quire more of a balancing than the Board is currently applying. While an em-
ployer should not be able to justify every economic layoff decision without prior
bargaining, the Board should commit more than one sentence of its opinions to
the balancing of the burden that bargaining will place on the employer. Bar-
gaining over a decision to lay off two or three employees may evolve into bar-
gaining over a decision to lay off twenty or thirty if quick action is needed on
the part of the employer to curb an economic decline. The adoption of the two
step test and a more thorough balancing would give life to the Supreme Court's
mandate that all employers should be free from constraints to the extent neces-
sary for the operation of a profitable business and would provide employers with
a guideline to determine which economic circumstances fall within the
exception.
B. Considering the Burden on the Employer
Unilateral action by the employer has been permitted by the courts under
certain circumstances. These past decisions provide the Board with a preceden-
tial backdrop that can be used to determine whether the benefit of bargaining
outweighs the resultant burden placed on the employer's effort to operate a
profitable business. The first category of accepted unilateral action concerns de-
cisions at the core of managerial control. First National Maintenance is an ex-
ample of this category. The employer was permitted to terminate a contract
with a customer without prior bargaining even though the effect of the termina-
tion of the contract was the termination of certain employees who were mem-
bers of a recently certified bargaining unit. 03 The negotiation or unilateral ter-
mination of the contract with the customer was considered within the core of
managerial control.
100. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text (noting the three separate formulations of the First Na-
tional Maintenance test).
101. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
102. Although a union may offer wage concessions or givebacks, these decisions must go through the slow
bargaining process, preventing the employer from reacting quickly to an economic downturn.
103. First Nat'i Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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The Board also accepted the managerial control exception in Kingwood
Mining Co.""' In Kingwood, the employer shut down its coal-mining operation
and subcontracted the work, but continued to operate a portion of the business
that processed coal.10 5 The Board held that the employer was not required to
bargain because the decision to terminate the mining operation was a basic
management decision independent of the other operation. 06
Member Dennis' concurring opinion in Otis II mentions several circuit
courts of appeals decisions that recognized the core of managerial control cate-
gory. 0 7 Although the Board has often failed to give effect to appellate court
decisions, 08 these decisions provide satisfactory examples of how and when the
Board should apply the step two balancing test. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, for example, held that an airline had no duty to bargain over a
decision to merge with another airline in International Association of Machin-
ists v. Northeast Airlines.09 The court stated that "merger negotiations require
a secrecy, flexibility and quickness antithetical to collective bargaining.""' Fur-
thermore, in NLRB v. Adams Dairy,"' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that an employer did not violate the NLRA when it made a basic
operational change." 2 In Adams Dairy, the employer decided to replace its ex-
isting distribution system of driver-salesmen with independent contractors." 3
The court did not require bargaining over this decision because it would have
significantly abridged the employer's ability to manage its own affairs."' Al-
though the decision to lay off employees is probably not a change in the basic
structure of an employer's business, the above cases are valuable because they
demonstrate that the burden placed on the employer by bargaining has been
considered effectively in the past and should be considered by the Board in the
future.
A second category of accepted unilateral action by the employer more
closely related to the subject of economic layoffs is the compelling economic
circumstance category. This category contains cases in which unilateral action
by the employer, often involving a managerial-core type decision, has been ex-
cused because of economic circumstances that require the employer to take
quick and decisive action. This category differs from the first category in that
these decisions are the result of pressing economic circumstances and have not
104. 210 N.L.R.B. 844 (1974).
105. Id. at 844-45.
106. Id. at 845.
107. 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 897-98 (1984) (Dennis, concurring).
108. Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE FoREST L
REV. 399 (1988). Modjeska writes that the Board "determines on an ad hoc discretionary basis whether or not to
acquiesce in the views of the national labor law ... articulated by the various federal circuit courts of appeal."
Id. at 399. This position leaves open the possibility of using the cited courts of appeals decisions as a guide when
applying the First National Maintenance test.
109. 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972).
110. Id. at 557. See also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 683 n.20 (1980).
111. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
112. Id. at 111.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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been in the planning stages for many months. In New York Mirror,"5 the em-
ployer decided to sell its business and, therefore, unilaterally terminate opera-
tions. " 6 Noting that the decision to shut down was brought on solely by press-
ing economic necessity, the Board found no duty to bargain over the shutdown
decision.112 A key factor in this decision was the Supreme Court's statement in
NLRB v. Katz," 8 which left open the possibility that certain circumstances
might excuse unilateral action by the employer." 9 Moreover, in General Motors
Corp.,220 as modified by Royal Typewriter Co.,'2 ' the Board held that an em-
ployer does not have to bargain about an economically motivated decision to sell
an independent dealership.1 2 Finally, in Royal Plating & Polishing,28 an em-
ployer that had been suffering losses for seven years decided to close one of its
plants instead of relocating the plant.1"" The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found no NLRA violation because economic circumstances required the
company to recommit and reinvest funds into the business. 2 5
While the preceding cases are extreme examples of economic hardship, the
concurring opinion by Member Dennis in Otis H provides a few examples of
compelling economic circumstances of a positive nature in which no prior bar-
gaining was required. 2' In NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp.,27 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the burden on the employer
of bargaining over the employer's decision to expand its port facilities in order
to keep its principal customer.' 28 The court did not require bargaining, finding
the loss of the customer highly probable unless the employer took quick and
decisive action.'2 9 Similarly, in NLRB v. Rapid Bindery,2 0 the employer was
not required to bargain over a decision to transfer plant operations to a larger
facility in order to avoid losing a principal customer.151
Although the courts in both Transmarine Navigation Corp. and Rapid
Bindery permitted the employer's unilateral action based upon the core of man-
agerial control theory, Member Dennis correctly cites these cases as examples
where the employer burden elements of speed and flexibility, among others, out-
weigh the benefit of bargaining to the bargaining process. 8 2 When faced with
115. 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
116. Id. at 835-37.
117. Id. at 841.
118. 369 U.S. 736, 748 (1961).
119. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. at 841.
120. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
121. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974).
122. Id. at 1012.
123. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
124. Id. at 193.
125. Id. at 196.
126. 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 898 (1984) (Dennis, concurring).
127. 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
128. Id. at 934, 936.
129. Id. at 936.
130. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
131. Id. at 175-76.
132. Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 898 & n.13 (Dennis, concurring). The fact that both decisions predate First
National Maintenance and Otis II explains the absence of any discussion of employer burden elements that must
be examined in step two of the First National Maintenance test.
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the loss of a principal customer due to positive economic developments, both
employers were able to respond quickly and decisively because they were not
slowed by a lengthy bargaining period.
The compelling economic circumstance category, as well as the managerial
core category, will provide the Board with a proper framework for balancing the
burden placed on the employer as required by step two of the First National
Maintenance test. Moreover, Member Dennis' concurring opinion in Otis II sets
forth several burden elements that should be considered when applying the bal-
ance including speed, flexibility, extent of capital commitment, confidentiality,
and extent of changes in operations.1 33 Member Dennis' use of the Transmarine
Navigation Corp. and Rapid Bindery decisions to demonstrate the speed and
flexibility burden elements is particularly noteworthy because the decisions per-
mit unilateral action by the employer arising from unusually positive economic
circumstances. On the other hand, in Royal Plating & Polishing, the court ex-
cused the unilateral action of closing down a plant because of severe economic
losses. The subject of economic layoffs would seem to fall somewhere between
these two opposite examples. Speed and flexibility are extremely important in
the decision to implement economic layoffs. A decision to lay off a small num-
ber of employees in an effort to cut economic losses must not be delayed be-
cause any delay may cause the loss to increase, thus requiring the layoff of a
larger number of employees. As in Transmarine Navigation Corp. and Rapid
Bindery, the employer must be free to implement certain economically necessi-
tated layoffs without any bargaining delay.
Although this Comment does not suggest that every economically moti-
vated decision to implement layoffs would meet the step two balancing test, it
does suggest that the Board should apply the balancing test in a more thorough
manner instead of merely paying lip service to the compelling economic circum-
stance defense. Using the various court and Board decisions permitting unilat-
eral action under certain circumstances, and the factors offered by Member
Dennis, the Board is capable of, and should apply, a thorough balancing which
considers the burden that bargaining places on the employer planning economi-
cally motivated layoffs.
C. Further Justification For Balancing: Economic Health
A final policy consideration exists that provides strong support for the First
National Maintenance two step test. Unilateral action by the employer is usu-
ally, if not always, considered illegal by the Board1 4 because it tends to "under-
mine the prestige of the union in the eyes of the employees."' 135 This, in turn,
may cause the employees to withdraw their support from the union, or the em-
ployees may become so outraged that they take action to interrupt the ordinary
course of business.' Using this rationale, the Board strikes down any unilateral
133. Id. at 897 (Dennis, concurring).
134. See supra notes 12, 14-27 and accompanying text.
135. Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REv. 487 (1956).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co., 679 F.2d 200, 204-05 (10th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 497.
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action merely because it is unilateral. Various commentators, however, have
recognized that forcing the collective bargaining process on management in
every decision-making situation has a negative effect on economic efficiency.
Guy Farmer, for example, recognized that identifying subjects for the col-
lective bargaining process should be an attempt to appropriately accommodate
employee rights and management responsibility. 137 Farmer also presented a list
of areas that should be primarily the responsibility of the employer, including
"decisions as to price, products, processes, work methods and techniques and
the whole area of efficiency and economy of operation."'138 Farmer further rec-
ognized the burden placed on the employer by the collective bargaining process
itself. The submission of an issue to the bargaining process requires the em-
ployer to defer necessary business action. Moreover, bargaining will sometimes
completely negate the employer's power to make the decision because the issue
may be moot before it is bargained to conclusion."3 9 Viewing this problem on
the macroeconomic level, Farmer states that preserving freedom in employer
decisionmaking is a matter of public concern because management flexibility is
essential to "the preservation of a competitive position in the world.' 40 Al-
though he was writing more than twenty-five years ago, Farmer correctly pre-
dicted this country's current foreign trade problems. In an effort to encourage a
healthy economy which will generate more jobs, Farmer concludes:
Employers must of necessity, therefore, become more cost-conscious and must have
the means and the freedom to expand and contract their operations, to eliminate one
operation or add another, to install new processes and discard old ones, to eliminate
jobs or change their content, and indeed, to give up the ghost entirely if competitive
factors dictate.'41
A second commentator, Mark Goldman, also recognized the basic conflict
between achieving long-run economic growth and implementing the policies of
the NLRA."42 The Board must realize that the union cannot objectively evalu-
ate certain decisions because the union will always seek a result that will benefit
the union at the expense of the economy in general. 43 The Board must consider
this effect on the general economy when making decisions that involve economi-
cally motivated layoffs or other unilateral action. Goldman also is of the opinion
that the free flow of capital is so essential to long-term growth that the em-
ployer should be put in a superior economic position during the bargaining pro-
cess if necessary to maintain the free flow of capital.1 44 This freedom is then
generally beneficial to labor because employees are also consumers who benefit
from an economy that responds to their desires, and because a greater national
137. Farmer, Good Faith Bargaining Over Subcontracting, 51 GEo. LJ. 558, 565 (1963).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 567.
140. Id. at 568-69.
141. Id. at 577.
142. Comment, "Partial Terminations'--A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1089 (1967).
143. Id. at 1091.
144. Id. at 1093.
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income will generate increased consumption and investment which increases the
demand for labor services.'"
Although Goldman's comments were directed toward partial terminations,
many of his thoughts have relevance to the subject of economic layoffs. When
economic conditions result in one part of a business becoming unprofitable, "the
supply and demand forces of the economy have signaled to the employer that
his particular conduct is in overabundance relative to demand. ' 146 The Lapeer
Foundry-line cases are clear examples of the economy sending a message to
employers that they are not operating efficiently and must, therefore, take quick
action to avoid severe economic losses. If the employer is unable to accomplish
this goal, it runs the risk that the entire operation will shut down as a result of
financial problems, in which case all the employees will be laid off.
A third commentator, Raymond Goetz, also recognized the economic im-
pact of bargaining over a management decision to subcontract work or to en-
tirely shut down an operation. 4" Similar to the commentators mentioned above,
Goetz laments the lack of significance that the Board has traditionally attached
to "the degree of economic necessity for . . . unilateral action.' 48 Goetz fur-
ther considers union tactics that have an adverse effect on employers' behavior.
Union tactics suQh as blocking, delaying, or modifying the employer's action by
threatening or using economic pressure, affect estimated cost savings of particu-
lar employer actions. 49 These extra costs are increased if the employer takes
unilateral action and is then penalized by an expensive Board remedy. 50 There-
fore, if every unilateral action is submitted to the bargaining process, the union
can "elevate its status to that of a co-manager whose views . . . must be solic-
ited and considered in connection with every decision which might affect the
employment relationship."'' 1
In addition to the negative effect of union delay tactics, Goetz also cor-
rectly interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Katz, 5 2 which inti-
mated that certain unilateral acts may not be violative of the NLRA.ee Al-
though economic layoffs affect employment, they are the inevitable result of
economic downturns over which the union has no influence. Conversely, if labor
as a national body decides to heap economic. pressure on management in the
aggregate, labor can have a negative impact on the economy by requiring the
employer to bargain about every management decision to the extent that the
145. Id. at 1093-94.
146. Id. at 1105.
147. Goetz, The Duty To Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Id. at 9-10.
151. Id. at 10, 14. Goetz makes a further theoretical distinction between bargaining about the actual decision
and bargaining merely about the effects of the decision. The actual act of making the decision does not affect the
employment because unforeseen circumstances may arise which make the implementation of the decision unneces-
sary. Only the actual implementation of the decision affects the employment of the unioi members. Therefore, it
is proper to bargain in reference to the effects of the decision and this Comment does not deny the legitimacy of
bargaining over the effects of an economically motivated unilateral layoff.
152. 369 U.S. 736 (1962); see supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
153. Katz, 369 U.S. at 747-48.
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employer is unable to operate profitably and hence must lay off more workers.
Laid off workers do not have the resources to consume goods and, thus, the
situation ultimately results in a depressed economy in which both the employer
and the employees suffer. These considerations led Goetz to the conclusion that
the Board is incorrect in its assumption that any unilateral action that relates to
conditions of employment is an illegal refusal to bargain under the NLRA.M
The common theme running throughout the articles written by Farmer,
Goldman, and Goetz is that the Board's assumption that any unilateral action
by an employer is violative of the NLRA, fails to take into account the harmful
effect that this position has on each individual employer as well as the national
economy. The management decision to lay off employees because of economic
losses is triggered by the forces of supply and demand, forces that the union
cannot control. The employer makes the decision not in order to harm the union
but in order to operate the company profitably so that the laid off employees
may, in the future, be called back to work. By requiring that every economically
motivated decision to lay off employees is subject to prior bargaining, the effect
of a slight economic downturn is multiplied as the layoff decision proceeds
through the sluggish negotiation process, thus delaying the implementation of
the layoff and increasing the losses suffered by the employer, which in turn may
result in more layoffs.
Alternatively, the Board should choose the path mapped out by the First
National Maintenance decision. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that all
economic layoffs are amenable to resolution through the bargaining process, the
second step or balancing test would provide the Board with a tool to deal with
the inherent conflict between implementing the policies of the NLRA and
achieving long-term economic growth. When applying the balancing test, the
Board will be able to weigh the burdens placed on the employer and on the
overall economy by forced bargaining on the subject of economic layoffs. This
consideration of the national economy is important to the country's competitive
position in the world market, especially in light of the newly developing foreign
markets of Eastern Europe, as well as the integration of the European Common
Market in 1992. This Comment does not suggest that no economically moti-
vated layoff decisions should be mandatory subjects of bargaining; rather, it
suggests only that the Board should abandon its rigid approach to this area by
adopting the First National Maintenance test as analyzed by Member Dennis'
concurring opinion in Otis II. If that occurs, the Board will not deem as
mandatory subjects of bargaining those economically motivated layoff decisions
in which the benefit of bargaining does not outweigh the resultant burdens on
the employer.
V. CONCLUSION
Approximately thirty years ago, in NLRB v. Katz, the Supreme Court re-
jected the position that all unilateral action by the employer is a violation of the
NLRA merely because of its unilateral character. The Court's concern that
154. Goetz, supra note 147, at 29.
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certain management decisions should not be mandatory subjects of bargaining
was later reflected in the two step test developed in First National Mainte-
nance. The two step test is formulated to protect the employer from burdening
constraints that would make it impossible for the employer to operate a profita-
ble business.
The Board, however, recently has had great difficulty (or perhaps an inten-
tional reluctance) in applying the two step test. For example, the Board's first
attempt at applying the First National Maintenance test resulted in three dif-
ferent opinions in Otis I. The recent Lapeer Foundry-line cases evidence the
Board's continued difficulty as well as its intent to completely ignore the balanc-
ing test contained in step two. In the Lapeer Foundry-line, the Board has failed
to consider the burden placed on the employer by requiring bargaining over all
economically motivated layoff decisions prior to their implementation, regard-
less of the employer's economic situation.
The Board should retreat from its strict stance toward unilateral action in
relation to economic layoffs and should adopt the two step test formulated in
First National Maintenance, as analyzed by Member Dennis in his Otis II con-
curring opinion. Using as guidelines past Board and court decisions which have
recognized that the employer should be able to take certain unilateral action
without prior bargaining, the Board should be able to apply the two step test
successfully.
In applying the two step test to the subject of economically motivated lay-
offs, the Board must clear both hurdles presented by the test. Step one requires
that the employer's decision be amenable to resolution through the bargaining
process. This hurdle presents a problem in relation to economically motivated
management decisions because there is little that the union can do to cure the
economic woes of the employer. It is questionable whether the union can do
anything to increase the demand of the employer's products so that the em-
ployer can continue to operate profitably with its current workforce. Even as-
suming that an economically motivated layoff decision is amenable to resolution
through the bargaining process, step two requires that the benefit of bargaining
to the bargaining process outweigh the burden placed on the employer. Only if
both hurdles are cleared should the employer's decision be deemed a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The balancing test in step two will allow the Board to
achieve a more desirable balance between those economically motivated layoff
decisions which should be subject to prior bargaining and those decisions which
should not. Lastly, the balancing test should be used by the Board to consider
not only the burden placed on the employer but also the burden that may be
placed on the national economy by constraining employers so tightly that they
are unable to compete in the world market. The time has come for the Board to
give serious consideration to the employer's plight, as well as the employee's, in
the area of economically motivated layoffs.
Roger L. Schantz
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